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COMMENT
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The administration of the charitable trust has continually eluded the
supervision of the law. Its proper use has made it of inestimable value as
an implement furthering our social welfare, but abuse by its fiduciaries
has caused considerable public loss3 The supervision and enforcement of
the charitable trust has long been conceded to be a governmental obligation,
but the sporadic demands for legislative reform 3 indicate some measure of
failure in fulfilling this obligation.4
An active force protecting and maintaining gifts effected through a
charitable trust can be found only in the favorable attitude of our
courts." However, the enforcement of the charitable trust, much like any
selfless endeavor, cannot be afforded the protection of our legal machinery
by the mere favor of the judiciary. Judicial mechanisms are not self-starting;
they must be primed by one legally constituted to do so. 6 The instrument
creating a trust expresses any limitations governing its administration.7 When
these limits are exceeded judicial aid is available to a proper suitor to guide
the return to the proper confines of the trust declaration.8 The private trust
suffers no handicap in this instance. A specific bcneficiary is indispensable to
the basic validation of such a trust.9 He benefits from proper administration
and the damage from any impropriety entitles him to a cause of action.10
In contradistinction, the 'charitable trust necessitates the indefinite com-
munity as its beneficiary,' the purpose of the trust substituting perhaps as
a factor in determining original validity.
Individual members of the community can personally maintain and
1. I-lennings, The Road to Destiny, 67 TRUST COMPANIES 721, 722-723 (1938);
Scott, Charitable Trusts in 3 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 338, 339 (1930).
2. Bushnell, Report and Recommendations for Legislation, 30 MAss. L.Q. 22 (1945);
Hennings, supra note 1.
3. Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 WaIl. I (U.S, 1868).
4. See-notes 33, 38, 46 infra.
5. See Noble v. First Nat. Bank of Anniston, 241 Ala. 85, 87, 1 So.2d 289, 290
(1941); Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana, 137 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940); 2 BOORET, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 (1935); Scott, Trusts for Charitable
and Benevolent Purposes, 58 HARv. L. REV. 548, 571 (1945).
6. Jenkins v. Berry, 119 Ky. 350, 83 SW. 594 (1904); State v. Rusk, 236 Mo. 201,
139 S.W. 199 (1911); see Allred v. Beggs, 125 Tex. 584, 589, 84 S.W.Zd 223, 228
(1935).
7. See Mc~ooky v. Winter, 381 Ill. 516, 524, 46 N.E.2d 84, 88 (1943); In re
Procter's Will, 157 Misc. 706, 709, 284 N.Y. Supp. 675, 679 (Surr. Ct. 1936); RESTATE-
MENT, TRusTs § 164 (1935); 2 ScoTT, TaUsTs § 164 (1939).
8. See Morehead v. Central Trust Co., 54 Ohio App. 9, 12, 5 N.E.2d 932, 934
(1937); 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS § 199.1 (1939).
9. Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 32 Eng. Rep. 656 (Ch. 1804);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 112 (1935); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 112 (1939).
10. 2 SCOTT, TRusTs § 199 (1939).
11. 3 Score, TRUSTS § 364 (1939).
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enforce rights peculiarly their own. Enforcement of those rights which
inure to the community in its entirety, however, must be limited by the
demands of practicality to a suitable representative. 12 The attorney general
or other public official is generally designated the proper enforcing officer,'
3
since traditional concepts of our law have pointed up the maintenance of
our charitable institutions as an obligation of sovereign governments. 14 Three
facets of the law comprise this obligation. Defending the essential validity
of the trust for a charitable purpose illustrates two such charges. Fortunately,
our courts universally indulge in a presumption favoring their validity not.
withstanding the presence of a public representative.' 5 This defense finds use
both where the attack hits the original creation of the trust 0 and where
failure is urged upon defect in the specific beneficial purpose17 of a trust
declaration.
The obligation to insure proper administration, however, bangs in the
air. Exemplary and pertinent law is in existence. It represents the progressive
instincts of past generations 8 and encompasses the remedial and preventive
improvements of modern statutory innovation. 0 As an abstract proposition,
it leaves little to be desired and upon occasional application it superficially
represents both material and spiritual justice. Unfortunately, by the time
the question of mismanagement comes before the court, irreparable public
damage has already been incurred.20 The indefinite beneficiary, vital to the
existence of the trust, is generally unaware of his beneficial interest.2' The
public officer, nominally designated to supervise the trust administration, is
often under no legal mandate to do so. 22 In effect, be has a duty if be is
reminded of it. Ministerial and supervisory functions are beyond the juris-
diction and capability of our courts,23 and cases affecting properties impressed
12. State v. Baker, 156 Kan. 439, 134 P.2d 386 (1943); Woulfe v. Associated Realties
Corp., 130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A.2d 399 (Ch. 1942).
13. Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278 (1928); Boyd v. Frost Nat.
Bank, 145 Tex. 208, 196 S.W.2d 497 (1946); 2 BocEaT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs § 411
(1935); 3 Scott, TRUSTS § 391 (1939).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Where settlor's failure to state a charitable purpose is the basis of the attack.
3SCOTT, TRUsTs § 395 (1939).
17. When the failure of a specific charitable purpose (beneficiary) is the basis of
the attack, the Cy pres doctrine may allow the court to extend the trust to a similar
charitable purpose. 2 BOERT, Tausrs AND TtUSTE S §§ 431-441 (1935); 3 ScoTr,
TRUSTS §§ 395-401 (1939).
18.. The first statute to regulate the administration of charitable trusts was enacted
in 1601. See note 34 infra.
19. See note 50 infra.
20. See notes 26-32 infra.
21. See In re Mead's Estate, 227 Wis. 311, 277 N.W. 694 (1938).
22. While the duty to enforce is conceded by the respective Attorneys General, a
duty to supervise by investigation does not exist.
23. Jenkins v. Berry, 122 Ky. 34, 92 S.W. 10 (1906) (court precluded from investi-
gating charitable trust by writ of prohibition); State v. Rusk, supra note 6.
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with a public trust sometimes pass before them under questionable circum-
stances without any notice being given to the existing enforcing agency. 24
In the Florida case of Jordan v. Landis,25 a charitable trust was created
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a coeducational vocational
school for Negro youths. The settlor declared the trust by executing
a trust deed in 1899 and the school, during the course of its operation,
became well known as an exemplary public undertaking and acquired
considerable endowment funds on that basis. In 1911, several of
the trustees and others incorporated themselves under Florida law as a
non-profit corporation, conveying the trust property to this corporation in
1924. In 1931, after this corporation had incurred an indebtedness far in
excess of the legal limit fixed in its charter, the corporate charter was
amended to extend the legal indebtedness beyond the previous excess
reached. The corporation thereupon mortgaged the entire trust property.
Upon default of these mortgages, foreclosure proceedings were instituted.
At this point, several heirs of the original scttlor became apprised of the
situation and called the case to the attention of the Attorney General. He
brought suit to quiet title to the trust properties, asking cancellation of both
the deeds from the original trustees to the corporation and the mortgages
securing the corporate indebtedness. The decree of the court nullified those
instruments and reestablished a public trust in the properties.
Despite two occasions before the court 20 when trust properties were
being manipulated under obviously improper circumstances, no notice
reached the Attorney General until thirty-eight years of administrative abuse
had elapsed. Other startling examples of public loss have appeared. 27 When
the memories of his own childhood prompted one settlor to create a testa-
mentary trust dedicated to a hospital and public park for the poor, twenty
years of unsupervised mismanagement resulted instead in an exclusive
suburban hospital and a private golf course remaining from a fortune of
lands and money.28 In another instance dissipation of $33,000.00 and the
burden of fifty-eight mortgages resulted from sixteen years under numerous
successive trustees under their own supervision. 29 Actual theft from his own
trust 0 and indifferent delay to a point fourteen days short of a condition
24. See Jordan v. Landis, 128 Fla. 604, 175 So. 241 (1937).
25. 128 Fla. 604, 175 So. 241 (1937).
26. Upon incorporation the charter must be approved by a circuit judge subject to
finding it in proper form and for an authorized object. FLA. STAT. § 617.01 (1951).
Amendment of charter requires approval of circuit judge. FA. STAT. § 617.02 (1951).
27. An outrageous example of a violent breach of such a trust was discovered and
remedied by Ephraim Tutt, benevolent Yankee Lawyer. TRAIN, YANKEE LAWvYER 106
(Spec. ed. 1944).
28. See Gredig v. Sterling, 47 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1931).
29. See State v. Bibb, 234 Ala. 46, 173 So. 74 (1937).
30. See Methodist Religious Soc. v. Armstrong, 231 Mass. 196, 213, 120 N.E. 678,
685 (1918) (trustee bought a claim against the trust at a discount and collected it
in full).
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reverting the title to trust properties3' were the results of two more ill-fated
charitable gestures. No accurate data is available to even apptoximate the
public loss, but it has been indicated to be substantial.32
Discoveries of this nature have afforded the impetus for comprehensive
investigation of charitable institutions and the enactment of preventive and
regulative legislation. The supervision of charitable trustees was deemed
necessary as early as the outset of the fifteenth century in England.33 The
English Statute of Charitable Uses34 was reenacted and enlarged in 1601, its
preamble setting out the first varied and detailed list of charitable purposes.35
This and similar contemporary acts were directed at aiding the government
in the relief of pauperism.
The statutes presently governing charitable trustees in England37 have
resulted from the progressive reform and development of those early acts. A
fundamental defect of the original statutes was revealed by the investigation
of a Parliamentary committee in 1835. The prevalent disregard of trust
obligations was traced to a failure to provide for regular, active and effective
supervision. The report38 of this committee moved Parliament in 1853 to
enact the Charitable Trusts Act :9 creating a board of charitable commis-
sioners. This body exercised general supervisory powers over all charitable
trusts40 and could compel periodic accounting from each such trustee. An
exemplary feature was the limited judicial power4" of this board to decree
and provide enforcement for their orders.
American law has not shown such concern with its charitable institu-
tions.41 Only in comparatively recent years have most states enacted statutes
regulating trust fiduciaries. 42 Merely an isolated few have legislation directed
31. See Carlstrom v. Frackelton, 263 Ill. App. 250 (1931).
32. Bushnell, supra note 2.
33. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 321 (1935); 3 SCOTr, TRUSTS § 391 (1939).
34. 43 ELIZ. c.4 (1601).
35. Enumerated as charitable purposes under the law were: the relief of aged,
impotent, and poor people; maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners,
schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities; repair of bridges, ports,
havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and highways; education and preferment of orphans;
relief, stock or maintenance of houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; supportation,
aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; relief and redemp-
tion of prisoners and captives; aid of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of
fifteens; setting out of soldiers and other taxes. See 4 HALSBURY'S L4ws, 107-138 (2d ed.
(1932).
36. See HOLDswORTH, IsoRY oi. ENGLISH LAw 389-399 (3d ed. 1945).
37. 15 & 16 CEo. V. c. 27 (1925).
38. The report filled sixty volumes and was the result of eighteen years of investigation.
39. 16 & 17 VICT. c. 137 (1853).
40. Certain religious and educational trusts were excluded. Id. § 62.
41. Subject to court appeal, the board handled mostly uncontested cases, rendered
decrees and punished for contempt. Id. § 14.
41a. 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 2054 (1939).
42. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38-1509 (1939); FLa. STAT. § 737 (1951);
MINN. STAT. §§ 501.12, 501.34 (1937); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:10-6, 3:10-24 (1939).
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exclusively at the charitable trustee.48 The Wisconsin statute" is repre-
sentative of the latter. It provides for an annual accounting to a proper
court with a penalty upon failure. Enforcement is left to the Attorney
Genera145 upon his own information or that of interested parties.
The nonexistence of an active and capable supervisory body is the basic
inadequacy of such legislation. 40 While nominal enforcement agencies are
set up by law, 47 the lack of properly equipped staffs leaves them unable to
properly exercise their functions. 48 They are left to depend upon private
citizens who are under no legal duty to give them the information necessary
for their action and who are often unaware of the existence of charitable
trusts.41
The New Hampshire legislature in 1943 provided the United States
with the first comprehensive and utilitarian act 0 regulating the administra-
tion of charitable trusts. That act required the office of the Attorney General
to compile a complete list5 of all such trusts 'operating within the state.
This Register of Charitable Trusts provides the lawful eniforcing agency with
notice of all charities within its jurisdiction. Authorization was also given
for extensive investigation52 by that office, with power to compel the appear-
ance of trustees5 3 at hearings and to elicit testimony 54 under a complete
grant of immunity from prosecution. The assets and liabilities of each trust
along with a detailed report of their receipts and expenditures makes up a
compulsory annual accounting5 due from each trustee. The name and address
of each ultimate beneficiary is another detail of this report. 56 Notice of each
testamentary trust of a charitable nature reaches the Attorney General from
the Registers of Probate under a further provision 57 of the statute. An
amendment in 194958 created the office of Director of Charitable Trusts.
He works with and has all the powers of the Attorney General in dealing
with charitable trusts. He is a member of the Bar and is appointed by the
Governor to a five year term.
43. See e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 7-714 (Burns 1933); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 68
§ 15 (Michie Supp. 1946); NEV. Comp. LAws § 7718.21 (Hillyer Supp. 1945); Wis.
STAT. § 317.06 (1949).
44. Supra note 43.
45. A further provision of these statutes enables ten interested parties to bring an
action if the Attorney General refuses to act. The interested parties, however, must be
donors to the trust or members of the class to be benefited. Id. § 231.34.
46. See Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 659 (1947); Note, 23 IND. L.J. 141 (1948); Bushnell,
supra note 2.
47. See note 13 suora.
48. 3 ScoTT, TRusTs 2053 (1939); Scott, sura note 1, at 339.
49. See note 21 supra.
50. N.H. REV. LAws c. 24 § 13 (1950).
5I. Id. § 13a.
52. Id. § 13e.
53. Id. § 13f.
54. Id. § 13h.
55. Id. § 13i.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. § 13i.
58. Id. § l3aa.
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Enactments of this nature wherein the supervisory and enforcing agen-
cies are effectively coordinated promise great relief in solving the problem.
Rhode Island followed the example set by New Hampshire and in 1950
adopted a similar act.59 Other jurisdictions have generally disregarded the
urgings of legal periodicals 0 and the reports of public officials. 1 Possibly,
the bland expressions of the law reports, showing little feeling for the
immense public loss, underlie the retarded progress of legislation in this field.
The need for effective supervision can best be seen when we consider
the role of the charitable institution in modem American life. By its broad
legal definition, 2 the social and economic importance of charity is greatly
enhanced. It extends to every contribution that can be directly related to
our social welfare . 3 Even the most rigid imagination might allow that the
funds of private philanthropy underlie and support the American standard
of living. In the achievement of a better way of life, education perhaps
stands out as the dominant factor. The enlightenment of increasing numbers
of our population through higher education has alone made us generally
better suited for a progressive and productive life. Recent astounding develop-
ments in scientific research which have transformed our physical and material
well being can be traced to the laboratories of our educational institutions,'
The contributions which maintain and support these institutions are legally
classified as charity.6
These contributions are encouraged both by the legislatures and the
courts."1 No real assurance is afforded the donor, however, that his charitable
expression will result in the fulfillment of his desires and satisfy the wants of
his intended beneficiary. The government has also failed to insure that the
public benefit received will balance satisfactorily with the favorable tax
provisions that it extends to charitable institutions. The enactment of
detailed legislation will cover these considerations, but the assurance that
charitable giving will be perpetuated has not yet been the concern of the law.
Despite a great increase in governmental assumption of these moral
obligations, 8 the private charity must still cover those areas not yet sus-
ceptible to government aid and supplement those perhaps still inadequately
covered. By supplementing the proposed legislation with the requirement
59. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 2617 (1950).
60. See note 46 supra.
61. See Bushnell, supra note 2; D'Amours, The Control of the Charitable Trust,
address at the fortieth annual meeting of the Association of Attorneys General (1946).
62. See note 35 sunra.
63. The purposes presently considered as charitable are well set out in RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 368 (1935).
64. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 222 (1950).
65. 3 SCOTT TRUSTS § 370 (1939).
66. ANDREWS, Op. cit. supra note 64, at 230; Lynch, The Charities Provision of the
Internal Revenue Code, 10 FORD. L. Rev. 234 (1941).
67. See note 5 supra.
68. ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 43; the forty-eight states, the District of
Columbia and all territories have public welfare programs. SOCIAL SERVICE YEARBOOK
402 (1951).
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that the accounting due the legal supervisors also be given the benefactors,
the continued success of these endeavors can best be assured. A requirement
of this nature will enable the donor to see the immediate results of his gift.
It will put the administrators of charitable institutions under the scrutiny
of interested observers and lend real meaning to the obligation of their trust.
BURTON HA-RRSON
